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Background: Many low- and middle-income countries are reforming their health financing mechanisms as part of
broader strategies to achieve universal health coverage (UHC). Voluntary social health insurance, despite evidence of
resulting inequities, is attractive to policy makers as it generates additional funds for health, and provides access to a
greater range of benefits for the formally employed. The South African government introduced a voluntary health
insurance scheme (GEMS) for government employees in 2005 with the aim of improving access to care and extending
health coverage. In this paper we ask whether the new scheme has assisted in efforts to move towards UHC.
Methods: Using a cross-sectional survey across four of South Africa’s nine provinces, we interviewed 1329 government
employees, from the education and health sectors. Data were collected on socio-demographics, insurance coverage,
health status and utilisation of health care. Multivariate logistic regression was used to determine if service utilisation
was associated with insurance status.
Results: A quarter of respondents remained uninsured, even higher among 20–29 year olds (46%) and lower-skilled
employees (58%). In multivariate analysis, the odds of an outpatient visit and hospital admission for the uninsured was
0.3 fold that of the insured. Cross-subsidisation within the scheme has provided lower-paid civil servants with
improved access to outpatient care at private facilities and chronic medication, where their outpatient (0.54 visits/
month) and inpatient utilisation (10.1%/year) approximates that of the overall population (29.4/month and 12.2%
respectively). The scheme, however, generated inequities in utilisation among its members due to its differential
benefit packages, with, for example, those with the most benefits having 1.0 outpatient visits/month compared to 0.6/
month with lowest benefits.
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Conclusions: By introducing the scheme, the government chose to prioritise access to private sector care for
government employees, over improving the availability and quality of public sector services available to all.
Government has recently regained its focus on achieving UHC through the public system, but is unlikely to discontinue
GEMS, which is now firmly established. The inequities generated by the scheme have thus been institutionalised within
the country’s financing system, and warrant attention. Raising scheme uptake and reducing differentials between
benefit packages will ameliorate inequities within civil servants, but not across the country as a whole.
Keywords: Access, Universal health coverage, Utilization, Social health insurance, South Africa, Government employeesBackground
Globally, calls to provide inclusive, equitable and quality
health care for all at affordable cost – universal health care
(UHC) – have gained momentum [1–4]. Many low- and
middle-income countries (LIMCs) are experimenting with
different forms of health financing reforms as part of
broader strategies to achieve UHC. These include in-
creased funding from taxation, national mandatory
schemes or voluntary social health insurance schemes.
(See [5] for a review of financing mechanisms in selected
LMICs). Recent LMIC experience suggests it is possible to
achieve UHC with various, often employment-based, in-
surance schemes, when complemented by sufficient tax
funding to subsidise membership for the unemployed and
those unable to afford the premium. For example,
Thailand, often described as an example of a successful
transition to UHC, followed this path [6]. However, the re-
sult is a patchwork of schemes with different benefit pack-
ages. These often entrench inequities by providing
differential access to services for different groups of the
population, thereby hindering achievement of ‘equitable
access to quality care for all’ [7]. Thus a key question is, if
faced with limited tax funding, should Ministries of Health
consider establishing employment-based schemes (with
cross-subsidisation that is internal to the scheme, such as
between the higher- and the lower-paid workers) as a
medium-term solution, which provides greater insurance
coverage for some? Or, should countries avoid establishing
employment-based insurance schemes and use available
tax funding to strengthen public sector services, which
then can serve as an equitable foundation for their health
care financing system, even if this means a smaller pack-
age of care for everybody [7–10]?
In 2005, the South Africa government introduced the
Government Employees Medical Scheme (GEMS), a
health insurance scheme for government employees,
which successfully raised the insurance coverage among
civil servants [11, 12]. More recently, other financing re-
forms have been mooted (a centralised pooling of general
tax revenue and value-added tax, a purchasing fund and
benefit specification). Yet, despite a government White
Paper on National Health Insurance in 2015, there has
been little progress towards finalisation of these reforms[13], and the publicly-subsidized GEMS continues along-
side a number of fragmentary private insurance schemes.
In this paper we ask whether the GEMS scheme has
further institutionalised inequities in access to health
care. Firstly, we examine whether insurance status and
socio-economic status (measured as skill levels, which
correlates strongly with income) influenced access to
care. This involved assessing whether the take up of in-
surance varied with health status, and comparing the
health service utilisation of members of the GEMS
scheme with their uninsured colleagues. Particular atten-
tion is paid to examining whether membership of the
subsidised lower-cost insurance packages have enabled
similar access (thereby improving horizontal equity1) for
lower paid compared-to higher-paid members. Secondly,
we investigate whether the design of the scheme, based
around differential benefit packages, has contributed to
inequities in utilisation of services. These findings will
assist other countries trying to balance the trade-offs be-
tween increasing the number of people with insurance
in the country, and therefore improving access to care
for some, against the inequities that ensue. A brief sum-
mary of the health financing in South Africa and the
GEMS structure is provided.
Background to health financing in South Africa
Inequitable access to health care is a key problem facing
the South African health system. Tax-funded public ser-
vices are utilized by the majority (84%) of the population
[14]. This majority (who do not have insurance) often
pay out-of-pocket to use private sector general practi-
tioners (GPs) and pharmacies [15], due to the perceived
poor quality of care in the public sector. The remainder
of the population (16%) are privately insured and use a
well-developed private delivery system [16].
The National Department of Health began exploring
the feasibility of various financing reforms after the tran-
sition to democracy in 1994. (See [17] for detailed policy
initiatives and proposal timelines). GEMS, a voluntary
and subsidized government employee medical scheme
was established in 2005 to provide “all public service
employees with equitable access to affordable and com-
prehensive health care benefits” [18] (our italics). GEMS
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that are fully subsidised for lower income employees, to
high-cost alternatives. The Sapphire and Beryl packages
offer members outpatient benefits through a limited net-
work of private providers (general practitioners, dentists
and optometrists).2 Sapphire and Beryl, however, differ
with respect to hospital benefits; Sapphire members are
required to use state hospitals, while Beryl offers access
to a limited private hospital network. Sapphire is fully
subsidised for the lowest paid employees and there is
consequently no financial reason for members of this
group to remain uninsured, although not all have taken
up membership [19]. The remaining three options
(Ruby, Emerald and Onyx) are differentiated by the
comprehensiveness of their benefit packages for out-
patient services, but all allow access to any private hos-
pital for inpatient care [17].3Methods
Sampling and data collection
Across four of South Africa’s nine provinces, 1329 gov-
ernment employees were interviewed in 2008–94 (full
details of study methods are detailed elsewhere) [12, 20].
Health and education, two of the largest public sectors,
were selected for the survey. To assess variation in util-
isation related to geographical access, two provinces
(Gauteng and Western Cape) were chosen on the basis
of being urban, having a greater distribution of private
providers and relatively well-resourced public health
care facilities, and two (KwaZulu-Natal and North West
Provinces) were selected for being predominantly rural,
with few private facilities and less-resourced public facil-
ities. The minimum sample size per province was 245
and this was inflated to 309 to allow for possible incom-
plete questionnaires.
Multi-stage random sampling was used. First, the
number of health and education employees to be sam-
pled in each salary category was determined by their
relative proportion in each province. Second, districts
in each province were selected with a probability pro-
portionate to number of employees, following which 15
schools and 4 hospitals within each of the selected dis-
tricts were randomly selected. Finally, within the se-
lected schools and hospitals, a sampling frame was
constructed of all employees, stratified by salary cat-
egory, to allow specific quotas of interviews to be con-
ducted across the different salary categories. Study
procedures received ethics clearance from University
the Witwatersrand (Human Research Ethics Committee
(Medical) Certificate number M080103), as well as per-
missions from the relevant Provincial Department of
Health bodies. All respondents provided signed in-
formed consent.Study variables and data analysis
Information was collected on health insurance member-
ship, and classified as uninsured, privately insured (pre-
paid schemes other than GEMS) and GEMS member-
ship. GEMS membership was further disaggregated by
type of benefit packages chosen, as described above. In
analysis, three packages (Sapphire, Beryl and Ruby) were
grouped together as ‘lower-cost’; with Emerald cate-
gorised as ‘mid-range’ and Onyx, ‘high-cost’. Participant’s
need for care was measured by self-rated health status,
assessed as excellent, good, average, poor and very poor
(the last two categories were combined). Access to care
was measured by utilisation of outpatient services (mean
visits/person in past month) and inpatient services
(admitted to either a hospital or clinic for one or more
nights in the past year). We used skill level of respon-
dents as a measure of socio-economic status, as this deter-
mines salary levels, which vary considerably across bands:
lower skilled (USD5,688–7109); skilled (USD7,317–
11,913); highly skilled production (USD12,577–22,588);
highly-skilled supervision (USD23,232–63,034); and man-
agement (USD72,057–142,400). We combined the last
two classes due to small sample size.
The data were double-entered by an independent sur-
vey company, cross-checked by the research team and
then analysed using Stata® 12 (Stata Corporation, College
Station, TX, United States). Comparisons of the means
of continuous variables were performed using the
ANOVA test. The frequency distributions were calcu-
lated and the chi-square test was used to assess associa-
tions between groups. Sample weights were not applied
as the sampling strategy was designed such that each
health and education employee in the four provinces
that participated had an equal probability of being se-
lected for the survey [21].
To identify inequities, we assessed the degree to which
need and access align across different socio-economic
groups. This involved several steps. Firstly, determining
whether insurance status was associated with socio-
economic status (Table 1), need (Table 2) and service
utilisation (Tables 3 & 4). We report these associations
among the total study sample and in the lower-skilled
workers, as well as examine variations in access across
the different GEMS packages. Lastly, using multivariate
logistic regression modelling, we examined whether ser-
vice utilisation was associated with insurance status,
after adjusting for need for services, and factors such as
age, gender, race, province socio-economic status and
sector (Tables 5 & 6). Four logistic models were con-
structed for the outcome service utilization, which was
operationalised as: whether an employee used any out-
patient (i) or inpatient service (ii), or any private (iii) or
public outpatient service (iv). Variables associated with the
outcome in univariate analysis (P < 0.1) were included in
Table 1 Distribution of health insurance status across by socio-demographics and salary grade
Variable (n) Uninsured
(342)
Privately
Insured
(574)
GEMS
(408)
GEMS OPTIONS Total
sample
(1330)*
Sapphire/ Beryl/Ruby
‘low-cost’
(67)
Emerald
‘mid-cost’
(305)
Onyx
‘high-cost’
(36)
Row % Col %
Age 20–29 (141) 46.1 22.0 31.9 13.3 84.4 2.2 10.6
30–39 (402) 25.6 40.8 33.6 16.4 78.4 5.2 30.3
40–49 (468) 21.4 49.2 29.5 17.5 75.9 6.6 35.3
50–69 (314) 22.9 46.8 30.3* 16.5 62.6 20.9* 23.7
Gender Female (778) 21.2 46.0 32.8 14.2 78.4 7.5 58.7
Male (548) 32.3 38.9 28.8 20.3 68.6 11.1** 41.3
Race Black (858) 28.9 39.9 31.2 16.7 80.3 3.0 65.0
Indian (77) 13.0 52.0 35.1 21.3 69.3 9.3 5.8
Mixed ancestry (253) 29.3 40.3 30.4 11.1 70.4 18.5 19.2
White (132) 6.1 63.6 30.3* 10.0 50.0 40.0* 10.0
Marital status Married/cohabiting (806) 22.1 48.3 29.5 16.7 73.0 10.3 60.6
Divorce/widow/separate (149) 22.8 40.9 36.2 24.1 59.3 16.7 11.2
Single (375) 34.4 33.1 32.5* 12.4 85.1 2.5* 28.2
Education None-primary complete (168) 51.2 25.0 23.8 44.7 55.3 0 12.6
Incomplete secondary (102) 33.3 34.3 32.4 21.2 78.8 0 7.7
Completed secondary (184) 37.0 23.4 39.7 19.4 72.2 8.3 13.8
Tertiary (876) 17.6 51.8 30.6* 10.9 77.7 11.3* 65.9
Sector Health (486) 35.0 34.4 30.7 17.8 76.7 5.5 36.5
Education (844) 20.4 48.2 31.4* 15.7 73.7 10.7 63.5
Province Western Cape (343) 27.1 42.6 30.0 20.8 63.4 15.8 25.8
KwaZulu Natal (310) 27.4 41.9 30.7 13.7 83.2 3.2 23.3
North West (331) 18.1 53.2 28.7 18.1 76.6 10.2 24.9
Gauteng (345) 29.9 35.1 35.1* 13.6 76.3 10.2* 26.0
Household income Median per month
Interquartile range
400
267–667
667
400–1333
547*
293–933
400
213–667
647
353–933
933*
400–1667
533
333–1067
Salary grade Lower-skilled (168) 57.7 19.6 22.6 44.4 55.6 0 12.6
Skilled (246) 39.4 21.1 39.4 21.9 75.0 3.1 18.5
Highly skilled (709) 18.8 50.5 30.8 12.0 80.6 7.4 53.4
Management (206) 7.3 63.1 29.6* 6.7 65.0 28.3* 15.5
Total 25.8 43.4 30.8 16.4 74.8 8.8 100
*P < 0.05. **P = 0.05–0.10. Sum of totals may be less than the total sample (1330) due to missing data
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tered the model’s fit.
Results
Socio-demographic characteristics of the study
population
Almost two-thirds had tertiary education, and more than
half were female (58.7%) (Table 1). Nearly two-thirds were
of black African descent, and 10% were white. Almost a
third of the respondents were classified as either lower-
skilled or skilled, half the respondents were highly-skilled
and 15.5% were in management. The median total monthlyhousehold income was US$400 in the uninsured, US$667
in those with private insurance and US$546 in GEMS
members. Median income varied by GEMS packages, from
US$400 in Sapphire/Beryl/Ruby, US$647 in Emerald and
US$933 in Onyx.
Comparing across insurance status and income
Insurance and health status
About a third of respondents were members of GEMS
(30.8%), 43.4% were privately insured and a quarter un-
insured (25.8%) (Table 1). Membership of GEMS was
most common among skilled civil servants, and those
Table 2 Self-reported health status in the whole study sample and in lower skilled workers, by insurance status
Variable Uninsured Privately
Insured
GEMS GEMS OPTIONS
Sapphire/ Beryl/Ruby
‘low-cost’
Emerald
‘mid-cost’
Onyx
‘high-cost’
Total sample
Total sample N = 342 N = 574 N = 408 N = 67 N = 305 N = 36 N = 1330
Health status Excellent (320) 27.0 20.9 26.1 32.8 23.9 33.3 24.1
Good (633) 44.9 49.1 47.8 34.3 49.8 52.8 47.6
Average (342) 25.5 28.2 22.5 31.3 22.6 8.3 25.7
Poor or very poor (34) 2.6 1.7 3.6** 1.5 3.6 5.6** 2.6
Percent had illness in last month (380) 17.3 33.1 32.0* 28.4 31.9 40.0 28.7
Lower skilled workers N = 97 N = 33 N = 36 N = 16 N = 20 N = 0 N = 168
Health status Excellent (23) 15.6 9.1 13.2 25.0 5.0 – 13.8
Good (73) 44.8 45.5 39.5 43.8 35.0 – 43.7
Average (58) 32.3 42.4 34.2 31.3 40.0 – 34.7
Poor or very poor (13) 7.3 3.0 13.2 0.0 20.0 – 7.8
Percent had illness in last month (43) 17.7 40.6 34.2* 25.0 40.0 – 25.9
*P < 0.05. **P = 0.05–0.10. Sum of totals may be less that the total sample (1330) due to missing data
No lower skilled workers were members of the Onyx option
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Conversely, private insurance was more common among
older employees, those with tertiary education, and in
management positions. Though overall a quarter were
uninsured, these levels were 46.1% in 20–29 year olds,
51.2% in those with primary or no education, and 57.7%
in lower-skilled employees. Employees who were single
were less likely to have insurance than those married or
cohabiting (34.4% versus 22.1%), as were health workers
(35.0%), as opposed to those in the education sector
(20.4%).
Among the whole study population, the proportion of
respondents reporting poor or very poor health status
was relatively small across the three insurance categories
(2.6% uninsured; 1.7% privately insured; 3.6% GEMS),
however nearly twice as many of the insured reported a
recent illness than the uninsured (17.3% uninsured;Table 3 Utilisation by insurance status
Variable Uninsured Privately
Insured
Total sample N = 342 N = 574
Mean outpatients visits/person in last month 0.33 0.80
Percent on chronic medication (385) 15.3 35.0
Percent any inpatient services in last year (161) 5.9 14.5
Lower skilled workers N = 97 N = 33
Mean outpatients visits/person (in last month) 0.44 0.67
Percent on chronic medication (47) 19.2 42.4
Percent any inpatient services (in last year) (17) 7.2 21.2
*P < 0.05. **P = 0.05–0.10
No lower skilled workers were members of the Onyx option33.1% privately insured; 32.0% GEMS) (Table 2). A
higher proportion of lower-skilled workers reported poor
or very poor health (7.8%) than in the overall population
(2.6%). These levels were particularly high in lower-
skilled GEMS members (7.3% uninsured; 3.0% privately
insured; 13.3% GEMS), and again twice as many insured
respondents reported a recent illness (17.7% uninsured;
40.6% privately insured; 34.2% GEMS) (Table 2).
Overall utilisation of any outpatient or inpatient service
Insured versus uninsured
The mean number of outpatient visits per month was
0.33 for the uninsured, 0.80 for the privately insured and
0.74 for GEMS members (Table 3). This association was
significant in multivariate analysis: the adjusted odds ra-
tio [AOR] of an outpatient visit was 0.35 in the unin-
sured compared to GEMS members (95%CI = 0.25–0.48;GEMS GEMS OPTIONS Total
sampleSapphire/ Beryl/Ruby
‘low-cost’
Emerald
‘mid-cost’
Onyx
‘high-cost’
N = 408 N = 67 N = 305 N = 36 N = 1330
0.74** 0.60 0.74 1.0** 0.66
33.3* 29.2 31.0 52.8* 29.4
14.1* 7.5 15.5 14.3 12.2
N = 36 N = 16 N = 20 N = 0 N = 168
0.68* 0.56 0.62 – 0.54
40.5* 43.8 36.8 – 28.7
7.9** 0.0 15.0 – 10.1
Table 4 Type of provider consulted by insurance status of respondent
Provider type Uninsured Privately
Insured
GEMS GEMS PACKAGES Total
sampleSapphire/ Beryl/Ruby
‘low-cost’
Emerald
‘mid-cost’
Onyx
‘high-cost’
Total sample N = 342 N = 574 N = 408 N = 67 N = 305 N = 36 N = 1330
Public Clinic 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.03
Public hospital 0.10 0.03 0.04* 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05
Private GP 0.10 0.37 0.33* 0.30 0.32 0.44 0.29
Private pharmacy 0.05 0.39 0.29* 0.25 0.28 0.47 0.27
Private Other 0.06 0.21 0.30* 0.10 0.34 0.44 0.20
Lower skilled workers N = 97 N = 33 N = 36 N = 16 N = 20 N = 0 N = 168
Public Clinic 0.09 0.12 0.08 0.13 0.05 – 0.10
Public hospital 0.16 0.12 0.03 0.00 0.05 – 0.13
Private GP 0.10 0.27 0.36* 0.44 0.30 – 0.20
Private pharmacy 0.06 0.21 0.14 0.06 0.20 – 0.11
Private Other 0.09 0.12 0.2 0.06 0.35 – 0.13
* p < 0.05. Note: No lower skilled workers were members of the Onyx option
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chronic medication in comparison to the uninsured
(15% insured; 35.0% privately insured; 33.3% GEMS).
Furthermore, nearly three times as many of the insured
had been admitted to hospital in the last 12 months
compared to the uninsured (5.9% uninsured; 14.5% pri-
vately insured; 14.1% GEMS) (Table 3), a finding also
noted in multivariate analysis. Similar differentials in
utilisation between the uninsured and insured were
noted among the lower-skilled group.
Utilisation by different type of providers and public or
private settings
Insured versus uninsured among the whole study
population
Overall, irrespective of income or insurance status, care
was more commonly sought from a private provider
than a public provider (Table 4; far right-hand column).
For example, the average number of consultations at a
private provider was between 0.20–0.29 per month, in
comparison to 0.03–0.05 per month at a public provider.
The uninsured seldom used public clinics (0.04 visits per
month), preferring private GPs and public hospitals for
outpatient consultations (each 0.1 mean visits), incurring
out-of-pocket payments for both types of visits.5 How-
ever, utilisation of the private sector providers was
higher among the insured than the uninsured. For ex-
ample, utilisation rates of private GPs were: 0.1 visits for
the uninsured, 0.37 for the privately insured and 0.33
visits for GEMS members (Table 4). Multivariate analysis
found that similar results with utilisation of private out-
patient providers associated with having insurance,
higher socio-economic status, as well as poor health sta-
tus (Table 6, right columns). Analysis, however, showedthe opposite was true of utilisation of public outpatient fa-
cilities, where adjusted odds of use were highest among
the uninsured, and those of lower socio-economic and
health status (Table 6; left columns). No major differences
were detected between service utilisation in the different
provinces.
Lower-paid members in comparison to higher paid
colleagues
Amongst the lower paid workers, similar to the findings
among the whole population, the insured used the private
sector general practitioners more than the uninsured, and
at a similar level to their better paid colleagues (Table 4).
Specifically, the average number of visits to a private GP
was 0.36 by lower-skilled GEMS members, and 0.33 visits
for GEMS members overall. Multivariate analysis findings
of associations between utilisation and pay level are de-
scribed above.
In sum, in multivariate analysis, GEMS members had
higher utilisation of private providers and hospitalisa-
tions than their uninsured colleagues. Use of chronic
medication was also higher among GEMS than unin-
sured workers in bivariate analysis. Multivariate analysis
also showed that, compared to higher paid workers, the
lower paid group were less likely to have an outpatient
visit or to be hospitalised, but had higher use of public
sector services.
Comparing effect of the GEMS insurance packages on
equity
Socio-demographic characteristics, benefit packages and
health status
Less than a fifth had chosen the low-cost options
(Sapphire, Beryl or Ruby; 16.4%). The majority of GEMS
Table 5 Factors associated with utilization of outpatient and inpatient care among civil servants in South Africa
Variables Any outpatient services in the last month Any inpatient admission in past year
Univariate OR
(95%CI)
Multivariate OR
(95%CI)
Univariate OR (95%CI) Multivariate OR (95%CI)
Age (years)
20–34 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
35–49 1.24 (0.94–1.64) 0.88 (0.63–1.23) 1.32 (0.84–2.06) 1.06 (0.66–1.72)
50–69 1.61 (1.17–2.23) 1.05 (0.70–1.56) 1.41 (0.85–2.35) 1.06 (0.60–1.88)
Gender
Male 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Female 1.64 (1.31–2.04) 1.52 (1.18–1.95)* 1.96 (1.36–2.81) 1.82 (1.24–2.68)*
Race
Black 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Coloured 1.42 (1.07–1.88) 1.32 (0.84–2.07) 0.82 (0.52–1.29) 1.26 (1.23–2.68)*
Indian 1.39 (0.87–2.22) 1.22 (0.73–2.06) 1.45 (0.77–2.72) 1.25 (0.63–2.46)
White 1.51 (1.05–2.19) 1.37 (0.87–2.14) 1.06 (0.61–1.84) 1.19 (0.63–2.24)
Marital status
Married 1.0 1.0 1.0 –
Divorced, widow or separated 1.28 (0.90–1.82) 1.18 (0.80–1.73) 1.35 (0.82–2.21)
Single 1.01 (0.79–1.29) 1.30 (0.97–1.75)* 0.89 (0.61–1.31)
Province
Western Cape 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
KwaZulu Natal 0.64 (0.47–0.87) 0.71 (0.45–1.12) 1.45 (0.88–2.37) 1.52 (0.76–3.03)
North West 0.77 (0.57–1.04) 0.73 (0.47–1.14) 1.52 (0.94–2.47) 1.49 (0.76–2.91)
Gauteng 0.74 (0.55–1.00) 0.83 (0.53–1.29) 1.43 (0.88–2.32) 1.49 (0.76–2.92)
Sector
Health 1.0 1.0 1.0 –
Education 1.49 (1.19–1.87) 1.41 (1.08–1.85)* 1.09 (0.77–1.54)
Salary grade
Lower-skilled 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Skilled 0.74 (0.50–1.11) 0.63 (0.40–0.98)* 1.23 (0.66–2.32) 1.15 (0.59–2.27)
Highly skilled 1.21 (0.87–1.70) 0.89 (0.59–1.33) 1.20 (0.69–2.08) 1.07 (0.58–1.99)
Management 1.38 (0.92–2.08) 0.93 (0.57–1.51) 1.53 (0.81–2.89) 1.49 (0.73–3.03)
Overall health status
Excellent 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Good 1.64 (1.24–2.16) 1.61 (1.20–2.17)* 1.37 (0.84–2.24) 1.30 (0.79–2.16)
Average 2.54 (1.86–3.48) 2.90 (2.04–4.12)* 2.78 (1.69–4.57)* 2.64 (1.55–4.50)*
Poor or very poor 3.73 (1.75–7.92) 4.04 (1.79–9.08)* 5.88 (2.56–13.49) 5.51 (2.27–13.34)*
Insurance status
GEMS 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Private medical schemes 1.08 (0.84–1.39) 1.00 (0.76–1.32) 1.04 (0.72–1.49) 1.00 (0.68–1.48)
Uninsured 0.35 (0.96–1.42) 0.35 (0.25–0.48)* 0.38 (0.22–0.65) 0.43 (0.25–0.75)*
*p < 0.05 in multivariate analysis; OR odds ratio; Divorced/widow category includes those separated. Multivariate analysis done with logistic regression models
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74.8%), and only 8.8% had enrolled in the high-cost option
(Onyx) (Table 1). Among the lower-skilled GEMS mem-
bers, 44.4% had selected low-cost options (more thandouble the equivalent figure amongst the whole group of
civil servants), and just over half (55.6%) had chosen the
mid-cost option, and none the high-cost option. Take up
of the low-cost options (Sapphire, Beryl or Ruby) was
Table 6 Factors associated with utilization of publicly and privately provided outpatient care services among civil servants in South
Africa
Variable Any public outpatient services Any private outpatient visit
Univariate. OR (95%CI) Multivariate OR
(95%CI)
Univariate OR
(95%CI)
Multivariate OR
(95%CI)
Age (years)
20–34 1.0 1.0 1.0 –
35–49 1.10 (0.60–2.02) 1.63 (0.85–3.14) 1.22 (0.93–1.63)
50–69 1.76 (0.92–3.36) 1.79 (0.85–3.73) 1.45 (1.05–2.01)
Gender
Male 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Female 1.47 (0.92–2.34) 1.40 (0.84–2.33) 1.53 (1.22–1.91) 1.41 (1.08–1.83)*
Race
Black 1.0 – 1.0 1.0
Coloured 0.75 (0.41–1.37) 1.55 (1.17–2.06) 1.47 (0.93–2.34)
Indian 0.52 (0.16–1.70) 1.60 (1.00–2.56) 1.34 (0.79–2.27)
White 0.61 (0.26–1.44) 1.66 (1.15–2.40) 1.47 (0.94–2.29)*
Marital status
Married 1.0 – 1.0 1.0
Divorced,/widow 2.08 (1.14–3.80) 1.09 (0.76–1.54) 1.11 (0.75–1.65)
Single 1.24 (0.75–2.05) 1.00 (0.78–1.28) 1.46 (1.09–1.97)**
Province
Western Cape 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
KwaZulu Natal 1.18 (0.62–2.25) 1.26 (0.63–2.53) 0.59 (0.43–0.81) 0.65 (0.40–1.04)*
North West 1.27 (0.68–2.38) 1.44 (0.73–2.85) 0.74 (0.54–1.00) 0.69 (0.44–1.08)
Gauteng 1.22 (0.65–2.28) 1.24 (0.64–2.41) 0.72 (0.53–0.97) 0.84 (0.53–1.32)
Sector
Health 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Education 0.20 (0.12–0.33) 0.27 (0.16–0.47)* 2.11 (1.67–2.66) 1.88 (1.43–2.48)*
Salary grade
Lower-skilled 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Skilled 0.50 (0.28–0.88) 0.49 (0.26–0.91)* 1.20 (0.78–1.84) 1.03 (0.63–1.68)
Highly skilled 0.16 (0.09–0.28) 0.37 (0.19–0.69)* 2.37 (1.87–4.46) 1.50 (0.97–2.32)*
Management 0.09 (0.03–0.25) 0.20 (0.07–0.63)* 2.89 (1.87–4.46) 1.69 (1.01–2.81)*
Health status
Excellent 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Good 0.98 (0.52–1.85) 0.94 (0.48–1.84) 1.76 (1.26–2.22) 1.73 (1.27–2.36)*
Average 2.32 (1.24–4.33) 1.73 (0.87–3.45) 2.21 (1.61–3.04) 2.90 (2.03–4.16)*
Poor or very poor 4.36 (1.57–12.12) 3.11 (0.98–9.88)* 3.05 (1.48–6.29) 4.10 (1.81–9.28)*
Insurance status
GEMS 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Private scheme 0.58 (0.31–1.08) 0.67 (0.34–1.29) 1.08 (0.84–1.40) 0.96 (0.73–1.26)
Uninsured 2.44 (1.44–4.15) 1.81 (1.02–3.21)* 0.20 (0.14–0.28) 0.21 (0.15–0.31)*
* p < 0.05 in multivariate analysis. Divorced/widow category includes those separated. OR odds ratio. Multivariate analysis done with logistic regression models
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cation or only primary schooling (44.7%), and lower-skilled
employees (44.4%). Emerald (the mid-cost option) was
more likely to be chosen by those who are Black (80.3%),
single (85.1%), and skilled or highly-skilled (75–81%). Onyx
(the high-cost option) was chosen predominately by whites
(40.0%), those with tertiary education (11.3%), and man-
agers (28.3%; Table 1).
Of the low-cost Sapphire/Beryl/Ruby members, 1.5%
reported having a poor or very poor health status, while
these figures were 3.6% in mid-cost Emerald and 5.6% in
Onyx members (Table 2). The frequency of recent illness
was 28.4% in Sapphire/Beryl/Ruby; 31.9% in Emerald
and 40% in Onyx members.
Overall utilisation of any outpatient or inpatient service
All GEMS members
Members of the more expensive packages reported a
greater number of outpatient visits per month (0.60 visits
Sapphire/Beryl/Ruby; 0.74 visits Emerald; 1.0 visits Onyx)
(Table 3). About a third of members of the low- and
mid-cost packages were taking chronic medication, in
comparison to half of the members of the most ex-
pensive package (29.2% Sapphire/Beryl/Ruby; 31.0%
Emerald; 52.8% Onyx).Lower-paid GEMS members versus higher paid members
Lower-skilled members of the low-cost packages reported
0.56 visits per month, similar to the average visits in the
whole population on these packages (0.60 visits), but half
that of the overall number of visits for their higher paid
colleagues in the high-cost package (1.0 visits) (Table 3).
There were no hospital admissions amongst the lower-
skilled members of the low-cost package.
Utilisation by different type of providers, and public or
private settings
All GEMS members
Members across all packages reported low levels of utilisa-
tion of public sector providers, ranging from 0.02–0.06 visits
at public clinics, and 0.03–0.04 visits at public hospitals.
Though not significant, utilisation of all three private sector
services was lowest in cheapest package, intermediate in the
mid-cost and most frequent in the high-cost package. Most
notably, visits to ‘other’ private providers (dentists, specialists
and private hospitals) by Sapphire/Beryl/Ruby members was
0.1, 0.34 in Emerald and 0.44 in Onyx.
Lower-paid GEMS members
Lower-skilled members of the low-cost packages re-
ported 0.44 visits to a private GP, the same as the overall
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macy (0.06) or ‘other’ provider (0.06).
In sum, overall utilisation was higher among members
of the more expensive packages. Yet, the lower-skilled
members of the low-cost packages had comparable ac-
cess to private GPs and chronic medication, although
limited access to pharmacies and other providers.
Discussion
Through GEMS, the South African government has im-
proved access to privately-provided care among govern-
ment employees, and protected its members from the
financial impact of out-of-pocket payments. However, as a
whole, the scheme has further institutionalised inequities
in access to health care. Firstly, insurance status of govern-
ment employees and socio-economic status influenced
utilisation of care. Moreover, the design of the scheme,
based around differential benefit packages, has contrib-
uted to inequities in utilisation of services. Members of
the higher-cost packages had higher levels of utilisation
compared to employees who chose lower-cost insurance
packages.
Of particular concern, uninsured government employees
continue to incur out-of-pocket costs: they use private
GPs only slightly less than the insured government em-
ployees, and visit public hospitals more frequently than
public clinics, requiring an income-assessed direct pay-
ment [17]. Those with lower socio-economic status, the
lower-skilled workers, were less likely to be insured, but
had four-fold higher levels of poorer health than the over-
all population. Much of the inequities among government
employees noted here would be averted should those who
are uninsured join the scheme. Achieving that, however,
would involve addressing the reasons for not enrolling,
which centre around administrative complexities, lack of
information about the scheme, and varying perceptions
around the need for health insurance, as noted in other
similar studies [22].
Although we did not assess this concern, transport
costs may have deterred poorer members from seeking
care [23], while supplier-induced demand (common with
fee-for-service re-imbursement mechanisms that are
used in the South African private sector) may have
raised the utilisation levels of better off employees [24].
Interestingly, Onyx members reported higher levels of ill
health than the overall population. There are two pos-
sible explanations for this: those who could afford to,
had chosen higher-cost packages that provided more
benefits because they were aware of their ill health, and
members of higher-cost packages were more willing to
report ill health, because their insurance would cover
the costs of care. [25]
More recently, there has been a policy shift towards
strengthening the quality of care provided by SouthAfrica’s public system [26]. This is due to a recognition
by decision-makers that a pre-payment vehicle that re-
quires membership will create a barrier to access (as
would happen, for example, by expanding membership
of GEMS to the broader population) [24]. By contrast,
free access to tax-funded provision does not impose this
access barrier [26]. There is an imperative to improve
the quality of care for all South Africans, not just the
formally employed. This is in line with the South African
government’s stated aim to progressively realise ‘the right
to care for all’ [27]. As quality of public health care hope-
fully improves, the intention is that government em-
ployees (and members of private insurance schemes) will
prefer to not pay high insurance premiums, but rather
seek care in the public sector [24].
While some steps have been taken to raise the quality
of care, little progress has been made with the proposed
financing reforms (a centralised pooling of general tax
revenue and value-added tax, a purchasing fund, and
benefit specification), possibly due to the difficulties of
implementing the reforms in a federal system. It there-
fore remains important to ask whether, despite this shift
towards strengthening public sector services, there are
advantages to maintaining GEMS from the perspective
of the South African government. Firstly, the scheme
may have reduced patient burden on the public sector.
Secondly, government employees are a key resource in
achieving other national objectives, and ensuring their
access to care may be a strategic, if inequitable, decision.
Lastly, in an already highly inequitable health system,
the scheme has facilitated a greater level of cross-
subsidisation than otherwise would have taken place,
and has enabled lower paid workers’ access to GPs and
chronic medication, similar to their better paid col-
leagues. Nevertheless, future efforts to reduce inequities
need to focus on introducing the planned financial re-
forms in a feasible manner given the capacity available,
and be specifically designed so as to meet the needs of
the poorer section of society. [28].
The 2010 WHO reports on health care financing con-
trasts the health system goals of increasing coverage depth
(reducing the extent of co-payments), scope (range of bene-
fits covered), and breadth (proportion of the population).
[29] Increasing depth or scope for a few will increase in-
equity, whereas to achieve UHC, a focus on increasing the
breadth, or the proportion of the population covered,
would ensure more of the population benefit from any rise
in the depth and scope of services available. Moreover, frag-
mented funding pools,6 including voluntary health insur-
ance, reduce the possibilities of cross-subsidisation, where
the healthy subsidise the sick, and the wealthy the poor [14,
30]. Thus, while GEMS has widened the scope and breadth
of coverage for some civil servants, in doing so it has in-
creased inequities in access in the country as a whole [31].
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in other low- and middle-income countries that have in-
troduced voluntary social health insurance – the rela-
tively affluent benefit more, while the poor gain access
to inferior services [32]. A study in Indonesia examining
the effects of Askes (a subsidized insurance scheme for
government employees) on access to care showed that
the insurance scheme had little positive effect on equity
in access of care [33]. Similarly, the introduction of
health insurance in India was not able to eliminate the
inequities in accessing health care services that stem
from disparities in socio-economic status [34]. Taking all
evidence together, a review of health expenditure data
from 138 low- and middle-income countries from the
WHO Health Expenditure Database, concludes that vol-
untary health insurance is not consistently linked to a
reduction in out-of-pocket payments, and several coun-
tries had exhibited a rise in out-of-pocket payments, as
well as a fall in government expenditure in health care
[35]. The review concludes “Many countries have paid
insufficient attention to the potentially risky role of
voluntary health insurance for equitable progress to-
wards UHC. Expanding voluntary health insurance
markets bear the risk of increasing fragmentation and
inequities.” [35] Going even further, the 2010 World
Health Report on health care financing states “it is
impossible to achieve universal coverage through in-
surance schemes when enrolment is voluntary” [36].
Once these schemes are established, they are very dif-
ficult to dismantle. In this case, phasing out GEMS
would mean that members have to pay premiums for
private health insurance without the additional sub-
sidy, or seek care at a public facility. Removing these
substantial employee benefit is likely to result in con-
siderable protest from civil servants. The currently
beleaguered government is facing almost daily civil
society unrest due to failure to deliver a range of ser-
vices and other concerns around poor governance
[37], and is unlikely to take action that would gener-
ate protest among its own employees.
The study has several limitations. The cross-sectional
design has a limited ability to examine the institutional
context within which insurance for civil servants has op-
erated, changes that occurred in the scheme and how
these have impacted on equity over time. Also, it is pos-
sible that factors influencing enrolment in the long-run
vary from those described here in the relatively early
stages of the scheme. Further, some study measures were
proxies and may incur measurement errors. In particu-
lar, use of skill level or salary as a proxy for socio-
economic status may be problematic as income can vary
over time. Asset indexes, such as type of household
dwelling and ownership of a car may be a more valid in-
dicator. We elected to use salary bands as this providespractical information for GEMS management and for
similar schemes on which cadre of worker to target.
Also, the wide differentials in salary bands suggest that
the indicator can adequately differentiate between socio-
economic groups. Strengths of the study include sam-
pling of several provinces and two sectors, which raises
the generalisability of the findings.Conclusion
By establishing the government employees’ medical
scheme in 2005, the government at the time chose to
prioritise access of civil servants to private sector care,
over improving access and quality of public sector ser-
vices for all South Africans. The scheme has generated
inequities due to the differential benefit packages, al-
though, through subsidised membership lower paid civil
servants are consulting private GPs and using chronic
medication at similar frequencies to their higher paid
colleagues. It is unlikely that the scheme will be disman-
tled or undergo a major reconfiguration, and as a result
the inequities have been institutionalised within the
health care financing system.Endnotes
1Horizontal equity refers to ensuring similar access for
those with similar need. Vertical equity refers to provid-
ing different access to care for those with different need
(e.g. better access for those with greater need). In this
paper we compare access to care of different members
of the scheme on different salaries bands, and therefore
with different socio-economic status, and as a result are
able to identify where poorer groups have less access to
care. This is a situation where horizontal equity hasn’t
been achieved, let alone vertical equity.
2Networks refer to designated health-care providers
contracted through the government scheme to provide
services to members
3Although both the public and private sector provide a
full range of services to patients, in practice actual
provision varies by level of service (clinic, hospital, spe-
cialist etc.), as well as the type of provider (clinic, general
practitioner, pharmacy, public or private hospital).
4Retired government employees were not included in
the study sample. This population was initially excluded
from participation in the government scheme, but later
included.
5Services at public sector primary clinics are free, but
a means-assessed fee is charged at public hospitals
6A country with multiple insurance schemes has frag-
mented funding pools. In contrast a situation with a sin-
gle national health service or national health scheme has
a single funding pool.
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